Lupyd.
Advanced Security Messaging Security

Signal Security Incidents and Controversies: Twilio, Signalgate, TeleMessage and Phishing, 2016 to 2026

A timeline of Signal's security incidents as of November 2026: the 2022 Twilio breach, Signalgate, the TM SGNL clone hack, Russian linked-device and account-takeover phishing, Cellebrite, subpoenas and patched bugs. Signal's encryption and servers have not been shown to leak message content.

Published: Nov 14, 2026
•
11 min read
Signal Security Incidents and Controversies: Twilio, Signalgate, TeleMessage and Phishing, 2016 to 2026

No incident so far has shown Signal's encryption or servers leaking message content. Signal's problems have come from around the edges: a phished SMS vendor in 2022, officials adding the wrong person to a group in 2025, an unofficial Signal clone that archived messages in plaintext, and Russian state phishing that tricks individual users into handing over codes, PINs or linked devices. When attackers read Signal messages, it was because they got into a person's account or device, not into Signal.

Below are eighteen notable incidents and controversies, from breaches and bugs to rumours that turned out to be false. The timeline is current as of 14 November 2026.

Signal Security Incident Timeline

Notable Signal security incidents and controversies, 2016 to 14 November 2026
Date Incident What was exposed Type
Oct 2016 US grand jury subpoena (Eastern District of Virginia) for two users' data Only the date and time each account registered and its last connection date, according to Signal Legal request
Dec 2020 Cellebrite blog post widely reported as having "cracked" Signal Nothing on Signal's side; the method parsed Signal data on an unlocked Android phone already in the examiner's hands Forensic claim
Jan 2021 Outage of more than a day after a surge of new users Nothing; service only. Signal said some chats might show errors but security was not affected Outage
Apr 2021 Signal publishes flaws it found in Cellebrite's UFED and Physical Analyzer Nothing on Signal's side; Signal said a crafted file could run code on a Cellebrite machine that scanned it Vulnerability (Cellebrite)
Aug 2022 Twilio employees phished; attacker reached Twilio's support console For about 1,900 users, either the fact that their number was registered to Signal or their SMS verification code. One account was re-registered Third-party vendor breach
Oct 2023 Viral rumour of a Signal zero-day in link previews Nothing; Signal said it found no evidence the vulnerability was real Unconfirmed rumour
Jul 2024 (reported since 2018) Signal Desktop kept its database key in a plaintext file No known exploitation; any process on the computer could read the key. Signal added Electron safeStorage protection Design weakness
Feb 2025 Russia-aligned groups phish Signal users with malicious linked-device QR codes (Google Threat Intelligence) Messages of individual targets who linked an attacker's device; Signal shipped hardening in Android and iOS Phishing (linked devices)
Mar 2025 "Signalgate": a journalist is added to US officials' Signal group about strikes in Yemen Strike timing, targets and aircraft details, seen by The Atlantic's editor because a member added him User error
May 2025 TeleMessage, maker of the unofficial TM SGNL clone used by US officials, is hacked Plaintext message fragments, names and contact details from its archiving server; 410 GB later published by DDoSecrets Unofficial clone breach
Sep 2025 and Jan 2026 (published Mar 2026) ETH Zurich researchers find two message injection flaws No known exploitation; a malicious Signal server could have injected fake messages. Fixed two and eight days after disclosure Vulnerability
Oct 2025 Signal goes down during the large AWS outage Nothing; service only Outage
Dec 2025 Pentagon Inspector General reports on Signalgate Found Hegseth sent sensitive operational information from his personal phone in breach of policy Official review
Mar 2026 Dutch intelligence (9 Mar) and FBI/CISA (20 Mar) warn of Russian phishing of Signal and WhatsApp accounts "Thousands" of individual accounts, per the FBI and CISA, through stolen verification codes, PINs and linked devices Phishing (account takeover)
Mar 2026 GitHub Security Lab finds attachment leak in the website build of Signal for Android (GHSL-2026-102) No known exploitation; a malicious app on the same phone could read decrypted attachments. Fixed in 8.4.2 Vulnerability
Apr 2026 Phishing wave hits German politicians, officials and journalists posing as "Signal Support" Accounts of individual victims; local media estimated at least 300 political accounts Phishing (account takeover)
Jun 2026 FBI and CISA update: attackers now ask for the Signal Backup Recovery Key Historical messages of victims who handed over their key Phishing (backups)
Oct 2026 CVE-2026-113380 in RingRTC, Signal's calling library No known exploitation; the other party could stop a hang-up from ending the call's audio. Fixed in RingRTC 2.72.0 Vulnerability

Sources: Signal's blog, support posts and transparency page, the FBI and CISA, the Dutch AIVD and MIVD, the US Department of Defense Inspector General, Google Threat Intelligence, GitHub Security Lab, the CVE record, the researchers' papers and major outlets. Full list in Sources & References.

The 2022 Twilio Breach: Phone Numbers and SMS Codes

Signal uses phone numbers to register accounts and, at the time, relied on Twilio to send SMS verification codes. In early August 2022 Twilio disclosed that attackers had phished several of its employees and reached internal systems. Signal said on 15 August that the attacker got into Twilio's customer support console and that, for about 1,900 users, either their phone number could have been revealed as registered to Signal or the SMS code used to register it was exposed.

Signal said the attacker "explicitly searched for three numbers," and one of those three users reported that their account had been re-registered. Anyone who re-registers a number can send and receive new messages as that number. Signal stressed that message history was not exposed, because it does not store it, and that contact lists and profile details are protected by the user's PIN. It unregistered the affected accounts, asked those users to register again, and encouraged everyone to turn on Registration Lock, which requires the PIN before a number can be registered on a new device.

Signalgate (2025): A Journalist in the Group

On 24 March 2025 The Atlantic's editor-in-chief, Jeffrey Goldberg, reported that national security adviser Mike Waltz had added him to a Signal group called "Houthi PC small group." Its members included the vice president, the secretary of state, the CIA director and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Goldberg said he saw messages about planned US strikes on Houthi targets in Yemen, including timing and weapons, before they happened. The National Security Council said the chain "appears to be authentic" and that it was reviewing "how an inadvertent number was added."

Nothing about Signal's encryption failed. The app delivered the messages, end-to-end encrypted, to every member of the group, including the one who should not have been there. Signal's president, Meredith Whittaker, did not comment on the incident itself, but posted that Signal is "the gold standard in private comms."

On 4 December 2025 the Pentagon's Office of Inspector General released two reports. The first found that Hegseth sent sensitive, nonpublic operational information over Signal from his personal phone, in breach of Defense Department policy, and that the messages drew on material marked SECRET//NOFORN. It did not decide whether he had declassified the information first, which he had the authority to do, and it warned the material could have endangered US personnel and the mission if intercepted. The second found that Pentagon staff did not consistently follow rules on electronic messaging and record keeping, and recommended a department-controlled messaging service. Hegseth called the first report a "total exoneration," a reading FactCheck.org disputed.

TeleMessage and TM SGNL: The Unofficial Clone (2025)

In early May 2025 a Reuters photo of Waltz checking his phone during a cabinet meeting showed he was using an app called TM SGNL. It was not Signal but a modified copy made by TeleMessage, an Israeli company owned by the US firm Smarsh, that archives messages for organisations with record-keeping duties. Researcher Micah Lee examined its source code and found that it sent copies of messages to TeleMessage's archive server in plaintext, despite marketing that described end-to-end encryption all the way to the archive.

On 4 May 404 Media reported that a hacker had broken into TeleMessage in about 15 to 20 minutes and taken snapshots of data, including fragments of messages and contact details of government officials. Anyone who loaded a public endpoint on the archive server could download memory dumps containing plaintext chat logs. Smarsh said on 5 May that "all TeleMessage services have been temporarily suspended." CISA added the flaw, CVE-2025-47729, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 12 May, and DDoSecrets later published more than 410 GB of the data.

Signal's response was short: a spokesperson said, "We cannot guarantee the privacy or security properties of unofficial versions of Signal." The lesson is general. An app that copies messages to a server someone else can read is no longer end-to-end encrypted, whatever name is on the icon.

Linked-Device and Account-Takeover Phishing (2025 to 2026)

The largest real-world compromises of Signal users have been phishing campaigns run by Russian state groups. None of them broke Signal. They tricked people into giving away access.

February 2025: malicious QR codes

On 20 February 2025 Google Threat Intelligence described several Russia-aligned groups abusing Signal's "linked devices" feature, which lets a desktop or tablet mirror a phone's account by scanning a QR code. The group Google tracks as UNC5792 altered real-looking Signal group invite pages so that joining actually linked the victim's account to the attacker's device, after which new messages flowed to the attacker in real time. UNC4221 built fake versions of Kropyva, an artillery app used by Ukraine's armed forces, with device-linking QR codes. Google also described APT44 (Sandworm) linking Signal on captured phones, and other groups stealing Signal Desktop data from already compromised computers. Google said Signal's latest Android and iOS releases contained "hardened features designed to help protect against similar phishing campaigns."

March 2026: Dutch and US warnings

On 9 March 2026 the Dutch intelligence services AIVD and MIVD warned of a large Russian campaign against Signal and WhatsApp accounts of officials, military staff and journalists, including Dutch government employees. Attackers posed as a support bot and persuaded targets to share verification codes or PINs, or linked their own device. AIVD director-general Simone Smit said, "It is not the case that Signal or WhatsApp as a whole have been compromised." On 20 March the FBI and CISA said the campaign had given attackers "unauthorized access to thousands of individual" messaging accounts, but "not CMAs' encryption or the applications themselves." Signal said the hacks were done through "sophisticated phishing campaigns" and that its encryption and infrastructure were not compromised.

April 2026: German politicians

In late April 2026 German media reported that Signal accounts of politicians, officials, military staff and journalists had been taken over, with Der Spiegel reporting that Bundestag President Julia Klöckner's phone was targeted through a group chat. The government did not give a number; local media estimated at least 300 political accounts. A government source told AFP the campaign was presumably run from Russia, which Moscow denies, and Germany's domestic intelligence agency had warned the Bundestag and cabinet in February. On 27 April Signal said "our encryption, infrastructure, & the integrity of the app's code was not compromised." Victims had been sent messages from accounts renamed "Signal Support" and talked into sharing verification codes. Signal said it would roll out new phishing prevention and detection measures.

June 2026: backup recovery keys

On 26 June 2026 the FBI and CISA updated their warning: attackers were now asking targets for their Signal Backup Recovery Key. With it, the agencies said, they "can view the account's historical messages." Their advice is to generate a new key in Settings, which stops the old one working for future backup downloads but cannot undo what was already taken. The agencies again said the attackers compromised individual accounts, "but not the CMA's encryption or the application itself."

Cellebrite and Physical Device Access

In December 2020 the phone forensics firm Cellebrite published a blog post about parsing Signal data, and some outlets reported that it had "cracked" Signal's encryption. Cellebrite later replaced the post with a shorter summary. Moxie Marlinspike, Signal's founder, replied on 23 December that the technique needed an unlocked Android phone already in the examiner's hands, which is the same as opening the app and taking screenshots: "It is not magic, it is mediocre enterprise software."

On 21 April 2021 Signal went further and published a post on vulnerabilities it said it found in Cellebrite's UFED and Physical Analyzer software after obtaining a kit. Signal said a specially formatted file in any app on a scanned phone could run code on the Cellebrite machine and silently alter its reports, and that the software bundled FFmpeg libraries from 2012. Signal offered to share details if Cellebrite disclosed the flaws it uses against phones.

The point for users is that end-to-end encryption protects messages in transit and on the server. It does not protect a phone someone can unlock. Disappearing messages and a strong screen lock limit what a seized phone holds.

Bugs and Vulnerabilities in Signal's Apps

Signal's apps have had bugs, like any software. These are the notable ones; none is known to have been used against users.

Desktop database key in plaintext (2018 to 2024)

Signal Desktop encrypts its local message database, but for years it kept the key in a plain configuration file that any program running as the user could read. Researchers including Nathaniel Suchy raised this from 2018. In July 2024 the Mysk researchers drew attention to it again on macOS, and Signal initially argued that an attacker would already need access to the computer. A pull request by developer Tom Plant from April 2024 proposed using Electron's safeStorage API, which wraps the key with the operating system's protection: Keychain on macOS and DPAPI on Windows. Signal then said it had implemented safeStorage support, shipping first in beta. On Windows, DPAPI mainly protects against other users on the same machine, so malware running as the user can still be a risk.

Message injection by a malicious server (2025 to 2026)

In a paper received by the IACR archive in March 2026, Kien Tuong Truong and Kenneth Paterson of ETH Zurich and Noemi Terzo of the Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy described two ways a malicious Signal server could inject fake messages. The first came from how Signal resolves username and phone-number identities and affected Android and Desktop; it triggered a safety-number change alert. The second, in Android's Sealed Sender implementation, could inject messages into one-to-one and group chats without users noticing, and the authors believe it had been there since 2018. They called the attacks "devastating" for Signal's integrity guarantees. Signal fixed the first two days after disclosure and the second after eight days.

These were integrity flaws: they would have let someone controlling Signal's server forge messages, not read them. They are the closest any public research has come to a weakness in Signal's end-to-end guarantees, and they were found because the code is open to inspection.

Attachment leak in the Android website build (2026)

GitHub Security Lab researcher Jaroslav Lobačevski reported on 28 March 2026 that the version of Signal for Android downloaded directly from Signal's website, not the Play Store or GitHub builds, let a malicious app on the same phone read decrypted attachments, including disappearing and unviewed view-once media. The app needed no permissions. Versions 6.38.0 to 8.4.1 were affected; Signal fixed it in 8.4.2 on 31 March.

RingRTC call teardown (2026)

CVE-2026-113380, published on 20 October 2026, affects RingRTC, the library behind Signal's voice and video calls, in versions before 2.72.0. The CVE record says a peer that floods a call's internal queue "can interfere with the ability of a local hangup to tear the call (with its audio and perhaps also video track) down." In practice the other person on the call could keep receiving your audio after you hang up. It carries a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.3, and CISA's assessment lists no known exploitation. Updating Signal on every device fixes it.

The zero-day that wasn't (2023)

In October 2023 a message spread claiming a Signal zero-day in link previews, citing the US government. Signal said that after a "responsible investigation" it had "no evidence that suggests this vulnerability is real," and that its government contacts had no information supporting the claim.

Subpoenas and What Signal Can Hand Over

Signal publishes the legal requests it is allowed to disclose on its transparency page, signal.org/bigbrother. The first, a 2016 grand jury subpoena from the Eastern District of Virginia covering two users, shows what it could produce: "the date and time a user registered with Signal and the last date of a user's connectivity to the Signal service." No names, contacts, groups or messages, because Signal does not keep them. The page lists later requests from Santa Clara County, the Central District of California, Luxembourg and, in March and November 2026, the District of Columbia, each with the same message that Signal cannot share data it never had.

Phone numbers remain Signal's main identifier, which is why the Twilio breach mattered. In February 2024 Signal added usernames and stopped showing your phone number to people who do not already have it, plus a setting that stops anyone finding you by number. Registration still requires one.

Outages

Signal went down on 15 January 2021 for more than a day after millions of people joined following WhatsApp's privacy policy change; it was back over the weekend of 16 and 17 January, with Signal crediting expanded capacity. On 20 October 2025 it was among the apps knocked offline by a large Amazon Web Services outage. Whittaker later said Signal had no realistic alternative to the big cloud providers for some of its infrastructure, and that end-to-end encryption means AWS cannot read messages. Neither outage exposed data.

What the Incidents Have in Common

  • The weak point is the account, not the cipher. Twilio, the 2025 QR codes and the 2026 campaigns all went after the steps around encryption: SMS codes, PINs, linked devices and backup keys.
  • People decide who is in the room. Signalgate was a group member adding the wrong contact. End-to-end encryption delivers to whoever is in the group.
  • Copies break the model. TM SGNL kept the Signal name but sent plaintext to an archive server, and that server was what got hacked.
  • Devices are the end of the line. Cellebrite, the Desktop key and the Android attachment bug all concern data that is already decrypted on a device.
  • The code gets checked. The message injection flaws, the attachment bug and the RingRTC CVE were found by outside researchers reading open source code, and Signal fixed them within days.

For how Signal's protocol compares with the MLS standard used for large groups, see libsignal vs MLS explained. For how other apps stack up, see which messaging apps are end-to-end encrypted, and for a messenger that uses the same protocol but has faced spyware rather than phishing, see WhatsApp's security incidents.

How to Stay Safe on Signal

  1. Turn on Registration Lock (Settings, Account) so a stolen SMS code alone cannot move your number to a new phone.
  2. Never share codes, your PIN or your Backup Recovery Key. Signal says its support will never ask for them in a chat. Treat any "Signal Support" message as phishing.
  3. Check Linked Devices regularly and remove anything you don't recognise. Be wary of QR codes and group invite links from unexpected sources.
  4. If you shared a backup key, generate a new one in Settings straight away, as the FBI and CISA advise.
  5. Watch your groups. Check who is in sensitive groups, and look for warning signs the Dutch agencies listed, such as contacts that appear twice or "deleted account" entries.
  6. Use only the official app from Signal's website, the App Store or Google Play, and keep it updated on every device.
  7. Lock and update your devices. Use a strong passcode and disappearing messages for sensitive chats, since a seized or infected device exposes what it holds.

Frequently Asked Questions

Has Signal ever been hacked?

Signal's servers and encryption have not been shown to leak message content. In 2022 attackers phished Signal's SMS vendor Twilio and exposed phone numbers or verification codes of about 1,900 users, and since 2025 Russian state groups have taken over thousands of individual accounts through phishing.

Was Signalgate a Signal security failure?

No. A member of the group added The Atlantic's editor by mistake, and Signal delivered the messages to everyone in the group as designed. The Pentagon Inspector General found that Defense Secretary Hegseth broke policy by sending sensitive operational information from his personal phone.

Is TM SGNL the same as Signal?

No. TM SGNL was an unofficial modified copy made by TeleMessage that sent messages to an archive server in plaintext. That server was hacked in May 2025. Signal said it cannot guarantee the privacy or security of unofficial versions.

What data can Signal give to police?

According to its published subpoena responses, only the date and time an account registered and the last date it connected. Signal does not store messages, contacts or group lists on its servers.

How are Signal accounts being taken over?

Mostly by phishing. Attackers pose as Signal Support to get verification codes, PINs or Backup Recovery Keys, or trick people into scanning QR codes that link the attacker's device. Registration Lock and checking Linked Devices help.

Final Takeaway

Signal's record shows encryption doing its job and attackers moving to everything around it: phone numbers, people, clones, linked devices and unlocked phones. Its servers hold almost nothing to hand over, and the flaws researchers found were fixed within days. The practical risks are the ones you control, so lock your registration, guard your codes and keys, and check who and what is linked to your account.

Lupyd uses the Signal Protocol (libsignal) for direct messages, so the protocol-level points here apply to its DMs too, while group channels use MLS. The same lesson holds: Lupyd's encryption cannot help if someone hands over access to their device, and Lupyd is a young product that has not yet had an external security audit. Its group calls are not yet end-to-end encrypted. Read how it works in Lupyd, or Download Lupyd.

Sources & References

Last updated: 14 November 2026.

Key Takeaways
  • ✓ No incident has shown Signal's encryption or servers leaking message content; attacks have targeted phone numbers, people, unofficial clones, linked devices and unlocked phones.
  • ✓ In August 2022 attackers phished Twilio, Signal's SMS vendor, exposing the phone numbers or SMS verification codes of about 1,900 users; one account was re-registered.
  • ✓ Signalgate in March 2025 was user error: a journalist was added to a group, and the Pentagon Inspector General later found Hegseth broke policy by using his personal phone.
  • ✓ TM SGNL was an unofficial Signal copy that archived messages in plaintext; TeleMessage's server was hacked in May 2025 and Signal said it cannot vouch for unofficial versions.
  • ✓ Russian state phishing since 2025 has taken over thousands of individual accounts via verification codes, PINs, linked-device QR codes and backup recovery keys, per the FBI and CISA.
Try Lupyd

The workspace where nothing leaks

End-to-end encrypted channels and chat for your team, built on the Signal Protocol and MLS. Available on macOS, Windows, Linux and Android.

Open Source

Explore Lupyd on GitHub

Inspect our open-source repositories, cryptography libraries, and client tools on GitHub.

Explore Lupyd on GitHub